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020			_a9780262046527 _c$125.00
020			_a0262041693
040			_cIIMU
082	0	4	_a330.015193 _bDUT
100	1		_aDutta, Prajit K _92720014
245	1		_aStrategies and games : _b theory and practice / _cPrajit K Dutta and Wouter Vergote.
250			_a2nd Ed.
260			_aCambridge : _bMIT Press, _c2022
300			_axxxiv, 671p. ; _c23cm.
365			_aUSD _b$125.00 _cINR _d1 USD = 86.40 INR
505			_aP A R T O N E Introduction 1 c h a p t e r 1 A First Look at the Applications 3 1.1 Games That We Play 3 1.2 Background 8 1.3 Examples 10 Exercises 15 c h a p t e r 2 A First Look at the Theory 21 2.1 Rules of the Game: Background 21 2.2 Who, What, When: The Extensive Form 23 2.2.1 Information Sets and Strategies 24 2.3 Who, What, When: The Normal (or Strategic) Form 26 2.4 How Much: Von Neumann–Morgenstern Utility Function 28 2.5 Representation of the Examples 30 Exercises 33 P A R T T W O Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice 39 c h a p t e r 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies 41 3.1 Strategic Form Games 41 3.1.1 Examples 42 3.1.2 Equivalence with the Extensive Form 45 3.2 Case Study: The Strategic Form of Art Auctions 46 3.2.1 Art Auctions: A Description 46 3.2.2 Art Auctions: The Strategic Form 47 3.3 Dominant Strategy Solution 48 3.4 Case Study Again: A Dominant Strategy at the Auction 50 Exercises 52 c h a p t e r 4 Dominance Solvability 57 4.1 The Idea 57 4.1.1 Dominated and Undominated Strategies 57 4.1.2 Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies 59 4.1.3 More Examples 60 4.2 Case Study: Electing The United Nations Secretary-General 63 4.3 A More Formal Definition 64 4.4 A Discussion 66 Exercises 68 c h a p t e r 5 Nash Equilibrium 75 5.1 The Concept 75 5.1.1 Intuition and Definition 75 5.1.2 Nash Parables 77 5.2 Examples 79 5.3 Case Study: Nash Equilibrium in the Animal Kingdom 81 5.4 Relation Between the Solution Concepts 83 Exercises 85 c h a p t e r 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly 89 6.1 Background 89 6.2 The Basic Model 90 6.3 Cournot Nash Equilibrium 91 6.4 Cartel Solution 93 6.5 Case Study: OPEC 95 6.6 Variants on the Main Theme I: A Graphical Analysis 97 6.6.1 The IEDS Solution to the Cournot Model 99 6.7 Variants on the Main Theme II: Stackelberg Model 100 6.8 Variants on the Main Theme III: Generalization 101 Exercises 103 c h a p t e r 7 Voting and Elections 107 7.1 Elections, Voting, and Game Theory 107 7.2 Voting Procedures 108 7.2.1 Majority Voting 108 7.2.2 Agenda Setting: an Example 109 7.3 Individual Rationality versus Collective Rationality 110 7.3.1 The Condorcet Paradox 110 7.3.2 A Way Out: Single-Peaked Preferences 111 7.3.3 Beyond the Condorcet Paradox 114 7.4 Competing for Votes 114 7.4.1 The Hotelling-Downs Model of Political Competition 114 7.4.2 Courting the Median Voter 115 7.4.3 Discussion 117 7.5 More on Voting Procedures 117 Exercises 119 c h a p t e r 8 An Application: The Commons Problem 125 8.1 Background: What Is the Commons? 125 8.2 A Simple Model 127 8.3 Social Optimality 129 8.4 The Problem Worsens in a Large Population 130 8.5 Case Study: Global Warming 131 8.6 Averting a Tragedy 133 Exercises 135 c h a p t e r 9 Mixed Strategies 139 9.1 Definition and Examples 139 9.1.1 What Is a Mixed Strategy? 139 9.1.2 Yet More Examples 142 9.2 An Implication 144 9.3 Mixed Strategies Can Dominate Some Pure Strategies 145 9.3.1 Implications for Dominant Strategy Solution and IEDS 146 9.4 Mixed Strategies Are Good for Bluffing 147 9.5 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium 148 9.5.1 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria in an Example 150 9.6 Case Study: Random Drug Testing 151 Exercises 153 c h a p t e r 10 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law 161 10.1 Chicken, Symmetric Games, and Symmetric Equilibria 161 10.1.1 Chicken 161 10.1.2 Symmetric Games and Symmetric Equilibria 162 10.2 Natural Monopoly 164 10.2.1 The Economic Background 164 10.2.2 A Simple Example 164 10.2.3 War of Attrition and a General Analysis 166 10.3 Bankruptcy Law 168 10.3.1 The Legal Background 168 10.3.2 A Numerical Example 168 10.3.3 A General Analysis 170 Exercises 173 c h a p t e r 11 Zero-Sum Games 179 11.1 Definition And Examples 179 11.2 Playing Safe: Maxmin 182 11.2.1 The Concept 182 11.2.2 Examples 183 11.3 Playing Sound: Minmax 185 11.3.1 The Concept and Examples 185 11.3.2 Two Results 187 11.4 Playing Nash: Playing Both Safe and Sound 188 Exercises 190 c h a p t e r 12 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction 201 12.1 The Extensive Form 201 12.1.1 A More Formal Treatment 203 12.1.2 Strategies, Mixed Strategies, and Chance Nodes 205 12.2 Perfect Information Games: Definition and Examples 206 12.3 Backward Induction: Examples 209 12.3.1 The Power of Commitment 211 12.4 Backward Induction: A General Result 213 12.5 Connection With IEDS in the Strategic Form 215 12.6 Case Study: Poison Pills as a Vaccine Against Takeovers 217 Exercises 219 c h a p t e r 13 An Application: Research and Development 225 13.1 Background: R&D, Patents, and Oligopolies 225 13.1.1 A Patent Race: 8K Television 226 13.2 A Model of R&D 227 13.3 Backward Induction: Analysis of the Model 229 13.4 Some Remarks 234 Exercises 236 c h a p t e r 14 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 239 14.1 A Motivating Example 239 14.2 Subgames and Strategies within Subgames 242 14.3 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 244 14.4 Two More Examples 245 14.5 Some Remarks 248 14.6 Case Study: Peace in the World War I Trenches 249 Exercises 251 c h a p t e r 15 Finitely Repeated Games 257 15.1 Examples and Applications 257 15.1.1 Three Repeated Games and a Definition 257 15.1.2 Six Applications 260 15.2 Finitely Repeated Games 263 15.2.1 Some General Conclusions 267 15.3 Case Study: Treasury Bill Auctions 268 Exercises 272 c h a p t e r 16 Infinitely Repeated Games 277 16.1 Detour Through Discounting 277 16.2 Analysis of Example 3: Trigger Strategies and Good Behavior 279 16.3 The Folk Theorem 282 16.4 Repeated Games with Imperfect Detection 285 Exercises 288 c h a p t e r 17 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market 295 17.1 The Background 295 17.2 The Analysis 297 17.2.1 A Model of the NASDAQ Market 297 17.2.2 Collusion 298 17.2.3 More on Collusion 300 17.3 The Broker-Dealer Relationship 302 17.3.1 Order Preferencing 302 17.3.2 Dealers Big and Small 302 17.4 The Epilogue 304 Exercises 305 c h a p t e r 18 An Application: OPEC 309 18.1 Oil: A Historical Review 309 18.1.1 Production and Price History 310 18.2 A Simple Model of the Oil Market 312 18.3 Oil Prices and the Role of OPEC 314 18.4 Repeated Games with Demand Uncertainty 316 18.5 Unobserved Quota Violations 320 18.6 Some Further Comments 323 Exercises 325 c h a p t e r 19 An Application: Logrolling and Pork-Barrel Spending 329 19.1 Earmarks, Pork, and Logrolling 329 19.2 A Simple Model of Earmark Spending 331 19.3 Bringing Home the Bacon with Grim Trigger Strategies 333 19.3.1 Equilibrium Conditions 333 19.3.2 Comparative Statics 335 19.4 When Bygones are Bygones 336 19.4.1 Renegotiation: A Good Idea? 336 19.4.2 Hoisted by Your Own Petard? Renegotiation Proofness 336 19.4.3 Penance Strategy: Renegotiation Proofness 337 19.4.4 Penance Strategy: Subgame Perfection 339 Exercises 341 c h a p t e r 20 An Application: Trade Agreements 345 20.1 The Purpose of Trade Agreements 345 20.2 A Tariff-Setting Game 346 20.2.1 Free Trade 347 20.2.2 Tariffs 347 20.2.3 Government Welfare and the Nash Equilibrium 349 20.2.4 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 351 20.3 The Repeated Game and the Design of Trade Agreements 352 20.4 Flexible Trade Agreements 354 20.4.1 Free Trade Agreement with No Flexibility 355 20.4.2 Free Trade Agreement with an Escape Clause 356 Exercises 359 c h a p t e r 21 Dynamic Games with an Application to Global Warming 363 21.1 Dynamic Games: A Prologue 363 21.2 A Global Warming Game 365 21.3 Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Global Optimum 367 21.3.1 A Computation of the Global Optimum 367 21.3.2 An Explanation of the Global Optimum 371 21.3.3 Recommended Global Optimum GHG Levels 372 21.4 Business as Usual Emission Level and Game Equilibrium 372 21.4.1 A Computation of the BAU Equilibrium 373 21.4.2 An Explanation of the BAU Emission Levels 375 21.4.3 A Comparison of the Globally Optimal and the BAU Outcomes 376 21.4.4 Special Feature of the Globally Optimal and BAU Strategies 378 21.5 Dynamic Games: An Epilogue 379 Exercises 381 c h a p t e r 22 Strategic Bargaining 385 22.1 Introduction 385 22.1.1 Tales of Bargaining 385 22.1.2 The Bargaining Problem and Bargaining Theory 386 22.2 Unanimity Bargaining: Negotiating a Merger Deal 388 22.2.1 Two-Stage Negotiations 389 22.2.2 Three-Stage Negotiations 390 22.2.3 Discussion 391 22.3 A Generalization: Sequential Bargaining with a Finite Horizon 392 22.3.1 The Unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 392 22.3.2 Some Observations 394 22.3.3 Experimental Evidence: The Ultimatum Game 395 22.4 Legislative Bargaining 396 22.4.1 Three Legislators and Two-Stage Negotiations 396 22.4.2 N Legislators and Two-Stage Negotiations 397 22.4.3 Qualified Majority Rule 397 22.5 Epilogue: Costly Bargaining and Conflict 398 Exercises 399 P A R T F O U R Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications 403 c h a p t e r 23 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory 405 23.1 Moral Hazard: Examples and a Definition 405 23.2 A Principal-Agent Model 407 23.2.1 Some Examples of Incentive Schemes 409 23.3 The Optimal Incentive Scheme 411 23.3.1 No Moral Hazard 411 23.3.2 Moral Hazard 412 23.4 Some General Conclusions 413 23.4.1 Extensions and Generalizations 415 23.5 Case Study: The Rise and Fall of Capitation to Compensate Primary Care Physicians in an HMO 416 Exercises 419 c h a p t e r 24 Games with Incomplete Information 423 24.1 Some Examples 423 24.1.1 Some Analysis of the Examples 427 24.2 A Complete Analysis of Example 4 428 24.2.1 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 428 24.2.2 Pure-Strategy Bayes-Nash 430 24.2.3 Mixed-Strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibria 430 24.3 More General Considerations 433 24.3.1 A Modified Example 433 24.3.2 A General Framework 435 24.4 Dominance-Based Solution Concepts 436 24.5 Case Study: “Final Jeopardy!” 439 Exercises 442 c h a p t e r 25 Mechanism Design, the Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer 447 25.1 Mechanism Design: The Economic Context 447 25.2 A Simple Example: Selling to a Buyer with an Unknown Valuation 449 25.2.1 Known Passion 450 25.2.2 Unknown Passion 450 25.3 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle 454 25.3.1 Single Player 454 25.3.2 Many Players 456 25.4 A More General Example: Selling Variable Amounts 457 25.4.1 Known Type 457 25.4.2 Unknown Type 458 Exercises 461 c h a p t e r 26 An Application: Auctions 465 26.1 Background and Examples 465 26.1.1 Basic Model 467 26.2 Second-Price Auctions 467 26.3 First-Price Auctions 469 26.4 Optimal Auctions 471 26.4.1 How Well Do the First- and Second-Price Auctions Do? 473 26.5 Final Remarks 475 Exercises 476 c h a p t e r 27 An Application: Price Competition with Cost Uncertainty 481 27.1 A Procurement Procedure 481 27.1.1 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium: Preliminary Observations 482 27.1.2 Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 484 27.2 Bridging Price Competition and Auctions 490 27.2.1 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction 490 27.2.2 Key Takeaway 492 27.3 Bertrand Price Competition with Incomplete Information 492 Exercises 496 c h a p t e r 28 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem 501 28.1 Motivation and Two Examples 501 28.1.1 A First Analysis of the Examples 504 28.2 A Definition, an Equilibrium Concept, and Examples 505 28.2.1 Definition 505 28.2.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 506 28.2.3 A Further Analysis of the Examples 508 28.3 Signaling Product Quality 509 28.3.1 The Bad Can Drive Out the Good 510 28.3.2 Good Can Signal Quality 511 28.4 Case Study: Used Cars—A Market for Lemons? 513 28.5 Concluding Remarks 514 Exercises 516 c h a p t e r 29 An Application: Crisis Bargaining and Escalation 521 29.1 Tales of Conflict 521 29.2 Unknown Military Strength and War 523 29.2.1 Complete Information: No War 523 29.2.2 Incomplete Information: Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 523 29.3 To Bluff or not to Bluff? 525 29.3.1 Signaling Military Strength 525 29.3.2 In Search of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria That Lead to War 526 29.3.3 When Challenging Is a Costly Signal 529 29.4 Escalation and Audience Costs 530 29.4.1 Finding Perfect Bayesian Equilibria 531 29.5 Case Study: Audience Costs Drivers and the Impact on Conflict 534 Exercises 537 P A R T F I V E Cooperative Games and Matching 541 c h a p t e r 30 Cooperative Games 543 30.1 Cooperative versus Noncooperative Games 543 30.1.1 A Tale of Two Games 543 30.1.2 Motivating Examples 544 30.2 Modeling Coalitional Games 546 30.2.1 Games with Transferable Utility 546 30.2.2 Games with Nontransferable Utility 548 30.2.3 Solution Concepts 549 30.3 Solution Concept I: Stability and the Core 550 30.4 Solution Concept II: The Shapley Value 554 Exercises 561 c h a p t e r 31 Matching Problems 567 31.1 Motivating Examples 567 31.1.1 How to Allocate Indivisible Goods without Prices? 570 31.2 One-To-One Matching Problems 570 31.2.1 Two-Sided One-to-One Matching Problems: Definitions 570 31.2.2 Two-Sided One-to-One Matching Problems: Stability 573 31.2.3 The Boy-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm 574 31.2.4 Boy-Optimal versus Girl-Optimal Stable Matchings 577 31.2.5 Strategic Behavior and Mechanism Design 579 31.3 One-Sided One-to-One Matching: The Roommate Problem 580 31.4 Many-to-One Two-Sided Matching Problems: School Choice 582 31.4.1 Many-to-One Matching Problems: Definitions 582 31.4.2 Deferred Acceptance Algorithm 584 31.5 Epilogue: The Game Theorist as an Engineer 585 Exercises 586 P A R T S I X Foundations 593 c h a p t e r 32 Calculus and Optimization 595 32.1 A Calculus Primer 595 32.1.1 Functions 596 32.1.2 Slopes 598 32.1.3 Some Formulas 599 32.1.4 Concave Functions 600 32.2 An Optimization Theory Primer 601 32.2.1 Necessary Conditions 601 32.2.2 Sufficient Conditions 602 32.2.3 Feasibility Constraints 603 32.2.4 Quadratic and Log Functions 605 Exercises 607 c h a p t e r 33 Probability and Expectation 613 33.1 Probability 613 33.1.1 Independence and Conditional Probability 617 33.2 Random Variables and Expectation 618 33.2.1 Conditional Expectation 619 Exercises 621 c h a p t e r 34 Utility and Expected Utility 625 34.1 Decision Making Under Certainty 625 34.2 Decision Making Under Uncertainty 628 34.2.1 Expected Utility Theorem and the Expected Return Puzzle 629 34.2.2 Details on the von Neumann–Morgenstern Theorem 631 34.2.3 Payoffs in a Game 633 34.3 Risk Aversion 633 Exercises 636 c h a p t e r 35 Existence of Nash Equilibria 641 35.1 Definition and Examples 641 35.1.1 Mathematical Background: Fixed Points 643 35.2 Existence of Nash Equilibria: Results and Intuition 648 Exercises 651 Index 655
520			_aThis widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory. _bTaken from the Publisher site.
650		0	_aEquilibrium (Economics) _92720015
650		0	_aGame theory _92720016
650		0	_aGames of strategy (Mathematics) _92720017
700	1		_aVergote, Wouter, _eauthor.
856			_3Publisher Description and Content Page _uhttps://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262046527/strategies-and-games/
901			_a5541~~~U
903			_a5541~~~U
904			_a<Game theory><Equilibrium (Economics)><Games of strategy (Mathematics)>
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