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020			_a9780000988706 (pbk.) : _c$148.00
040			_cIIMU
082			_a519.3 _223
100			_aNarahari, Y. _9386553
245			_aGame theory and mechanism design / _cY Narahari/
260			_bWorld Scientific, _c2015. _aSingapore :
300			_axxxix, 492 p. _bIncludes index
440			_aIISc Lecture Notes Series: Volume 4 _9386554
504			_aIncludes Bibliographical references and index.
505			_aTable of Contents: Front matter Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview Chapter 2: Key Notions in Game Theory Chapter 3: Extensive Form Games Chapter 4: Strategic Form Games Chapter 5: Dominant Strategy Equilibria Chapter 6: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria Chapter 7: Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Chapter 8: Utility Theory Chapter 9: Matrix Games Chapter 10: Existence of Nash Equilibrium Chapter 11: Computation of Nash Equilibria Chapter 12: Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium Chapter 13: Bayesian Games Chapter 14: Introduction to Mechanism Design Chapter 15: Implementation of Social Choice Functions by Mechanisms Chapter 16: Incentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem Chapter 17: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem Chapter 18: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms Chapter 19: Mechanism Design Space in Quasilinear Environment Chapter 20: Auctions Chapter 21: Optimal Mechanisms and Myerson Auction Chapter 22: Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions Chapter 23: Implementation in Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium Chapter 24: Further Topics in Mechanism Design Chapter 25: Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibrium Chapter 26: The Two Person Bargaining Problem Chapter 27: Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility Chapter 28: The Core of Coalitional Games Chapter 29: The Shapley Value Chapter 30: Other Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory Chapter 31: Stable Matching Chapter 32: Epilogue Chapter 33: Mathematical Preliminaries Back matter
520			_aThis book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students. A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience. After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics. https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/8902
650		0	_aEconomics _vMathematics.
650		0	_aGame Theory.
650		0	_aComputer science.
650			_aMachine design.
856			_3Publisher Description and Content Page _uhttps://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/8902#t=toc
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