Includes Bibliographical references and index.

Table of Contents:

Front matter
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview
Chapter 2: Key Notions in Game Theory
Chapter 3: Extensive Form Games
Chapter 4: Strategic Form Games
Chapter 5: Dominant Strategy Equilibria
Chapter 6: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
Chapter 7: Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 8: Utility Theory
Chapter 9: Matrix Games
Chapter 10: Existence of Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 11: Computation of Nash Equilibria
Chapter 12: Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 13: Bayesian Games
Chapter 14: Introduction to Mechanism Design
Chapter 15: Implementation of Social Choice Functions by Mechanisms
Chapter 16: Incentive Compatibility and Revelation Theorem
Chapter 17: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem
Chapter 18: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms
Chapter 19: Mechanism Design Space in Quasilinear Environment
Chapter 20: Auctions
Chapter 21: Optimal Mechanisms and Myerson Auction
Chapter 22: Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions
Chapter 23: Implementation in Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 24: Further Topics in Mechanism Design
Chapter 25: Correlated Strategies and Correlated Equilibrium
Chapter 26: The Two Person Bargaining Problem
Chapter 27: Coalitional Games with Transferable Utility
Chapter 28: The Core of Coalitional Games
Chapter 29: The Shapley Value
Chapter 30: Other Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory
Chapter 31: Stable Matching
Chapter 32: Epilogue
Chapter 33: Mathematical Preliminaries
Back matter

This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.
The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.
A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.
After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.

https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/8902